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Administrative Law: 




Students of comparative administrative law have long noted two 
things about the American administrative state that differentiates it 
from those of other advanced industrial democracies: the American 
administrative state is underdeveloped, and independent courts and 
legalistic behavior by regulators have an outsized influence on 
American regulatory policy. 
This article argues that these two phenomena are products of the 
American historical experience. In particular, the dimensions of the 
contemporary regulatory state result from a combination of 
ideological, political, and institutional factors. Ideologically, 
American political culture contains contradictory attitudes towards 
the state. Throughout American history Americans embraced a 
strong, “positive” state. At the same time, a powerful current of 
laissez-faire hostility towards the state permeates American political 
culture. This unstable ideological bedrock is the foundation upon 
which the modern American regulatory state is built. 
The political factors that shaped the rise of the administrative 
state in the United States were similar to those felt in all 
industrializing countries. The growth and dislocation caused by rapid 
industrialization led to political demands for the increased regulation 
and control of the emergent capitalist order. In the United States, 
however, these political impulses were filtered through and 
dampened by a national government with a particular set of 
institutional structures. Thus, the demands for regulation and other 
forms of state intervention were weakened by both the ideological 
ambivalence of American political culture towards the state, and 
obstructive institutional mechanisms. Ultimately, this ideological 
ambivalence and institutional resistance combined in the form of 
judicial control of the administrative process. 
 
 
                                                 
1. Summarized and excerpted from Reuel Schiller, The Historical 
Origins of American Regulatory Exceptionalism, in COMPARATIVE LAW 
AND REGULATION (Francesca Bignami & David Zaring eds. 2016). 
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The Stunted Development of the American Administrative State 
 
The growth of the American administrative state has been 
constant. Every decade of American history has seen political crises 
that have generated impulses towards regulation. In antebellum 
America, courts shaped common-law doctrines to promote economic 
growth, while states, localities, and, to a lesser extent, the federal 
government developed administrative mechanisms to protect the 
public welfare from the negative effects of such growth. The years 
between the Civil War and the Great Depression saw a dramatic 
growth of administrative institutions at both the state and federal 
level, as the American state responded to the dislocating effects of 
rapid industrialization and corporate consolidation. The Great 
Depression generated another round of regulatory innovation, 
resulting in many of the administrative entities that form of the core 
of our modern administrative and welfare state. Similarly, political 
and social reform movements of postwar America yielded regulatory 
mechanisms for furthering reform goals, be they the promoting of 
equal employment opportunity or a cleaner environment. More 
recently, economic crises have once again generated regulatory 
impulses, creating new regulations for banking and securities 
markets. 
While this growth of the administrative state has been dramatic, 
the peculiar institutional structure of the United States has inhibited 
it. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, judicial 
resistance under the guise of substantive due process was one 
limitation. Institutional obstacles imposed other, more persistent, 
limits. The American state is structured in such a way as to impede 
the development of national administrative institutions. Federalism, 
the requirements of bicameralism, and the customs and rules of the 
Senate fostered a form of political localism that made creating 
national regulatory regimes difficult. 
This fact was compounded by the extraordinary power of locally-
oriented political parties. Few politicians had much interest in 
creating national institutions that might undermine their power. Thus, 
rather than developing a tradition of bureaucratic governance, as was 
the case in Europe, the American administrative state developed as a 
piecemeal response to particular political pressures, processed 
through governmental institutions that themselves limited the 
effectiveness of regulatory policies. 
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This was particularly obvious during the New Deal. Lack of 
existing institutional capacity frequently required the administration 
to regulate through existing, often private, structures. Sometimes, as 
with the Security and Exchange Commission’s regulation of stock 
exchanges, doing so was successful. Other times, as with the 
National Recovery Administration’s dependence on industry boards, 
it was a disaster. 
Additionally, federalism, bicameralism and the disproportionate 
power of southern politicians due to one-party rule in the South lead 
to the devolution of public assistance programs and many regulatory 
regimes to state and local actors. This limited the effectiveness of 
many administrative programs. Southern politicians were not going 
to allow the Fair Labor Standards Act, the National Labor Relations 
Act, or the Social Security Act to upset the racial hierarchy in their 
state by lessening African American economic dependence on local 
whites. Similarly, state and local implementation of social-welfare 
programs was shaped both by that same impulse and by a genuine 
lack of state capacity. The only way to quickly implement a public-
assistance program in a country with a comparatively small federal 
bureaucracy was to enlist state and local officials into the process, 
even if doing so meant that some policies would be carried out in a 
manner that was less than fully effective. 
Indeed, even modern regulatory innovations bear the 
characteristics of the underdeveloped American state. They still have 
a patchwork feel, as if they are haphazard intruders into a “natural” 
world of private ordering. Many are still highly contested in the 
political arena, and are thus frequently hampered by aggressive 
political oversight. For some, the involvement of states required by 
federalism has created inefficiencies. Most significantly, all of them 
are weakened by the United States’ commitment to an outsized 
judicial role in the regulatory processes. This manifests itself in two 
ways. The first is the intensity with which courts oversee the 
administrative process. The second is the fact that both Congress and 
the courts have forced regulatory actors to act in a proceduralized, 
judicial manner. Agencies must behave like little courts, complete 
with procedures that inhibit efficiency in order to protect the rights of 
individuals from the power of the state. This is the final stop in 
historicizing the exceptionalism of the American regulatory state. 
Why are courts and court-like behavior so central to American 
regulation? 
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Courts and the Administrative State 
 
The modern conception of judicial review dates from the 
beginning of the twentieth century. It was then that courts divided 
any given administrative action into findings of fact, interpretations 
of law, and the application of law to facts. “Pure” issues of law were 
to be decided by courts, while factual findings and the application of 
law were done by the agency, subject to some form of intermediate 
scrutiny by the judiciary. Courts would review whether 
administrative action was an “abuse of discretion”; whether it was 
‘reasonable”; and whether it was supported by “substantial 
evidence.” Each of these standards sought to subject administrative 
action to a form of judicial monitoring that sat somewhere between 
absolute passivity and de novo review.  
Nor was the emergence of the appellate model of judicial review 
the only manifestation of judicial meddling with the regulatory 
process. The twentieth century also saw the increasing judicialization 
of regulatory entities themselves. Regardless of how intense judicial 
review of administrative action was, the agencies themselves were to 
behave in a judicial fashion. Their decisions should be made in an 
adversarial proceeding, with evidentiary records, independent 
adjudicators, and a chance for the parties to appear and confront the 
agency officials who would regulate them. This tendency is most 
obvious in the passage of the federal and state administrative 
procedure acts, all of which imposed these sorts of court-like 
requirements on agency adjudications. The due-process cases of the 
1960s similarly judicialized many informal agency actions. In the 
1970s, federal courts transformed even that least judicial of 
regulatory actions—issuing regulations—into an adversarial process 
by imposing a series of quasi-adjudicatory requirements on agency 
rulemakers: detailed notice, decisions based on a record, agency 
disclosure of data, and agency responses to cogent comments by the 
regulated. Thus, over the course of the twentieth century, courts 
developed a distinctive role in the American regulatory process. 
Indeed, even outside of the confines of judicial review, twentieth-
century administrative law expected agencies to behave like courts.  
Timing and legitimacy help explain the rise of judicial review 
and the judicialization of the administrative process. Courts asserted 
their control over the administrative process at the beginning of the 
twentieth century, just as the administrative state was becoming 
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national in scale and broader in the subjects it regulated. Thus, the 
rise of judicial control of the administrative process related to issues 
of legitimacy. To the extent that the vast majority of administrative 
entities in the nineteenth century were local and state bodies 
regulating in areas that were traditionally thought of as subject to 
government regulation, the administrative state’s legitimacy went 
unquestioned. Indeed, such regulation was legitimated by its 
connection to local, community norms. Regulation was thus 
legitimated by tradition. It was woven into the fabric of local 
communities. 
With the growth of national administrative structures and with 
the expansion of the palate of regulatory subject matters, this basis 
for legitimacy disappeared, and people went looking for others. They 
found these new sources of legitimacy in the courts. Since colonial 
times, American political culture assigned to common-law courts and 
the lawyers who practiced before them a special role in the protection 
of individual rights against the state. The legal profession’s job was 
to act as a buffer between the state and society, defending liberty and 
the rule of law. To assist lawyers in this task were some traditional 
mechanisms—juries and the common law—and distinctly American 
institutional innovations, especially judicial independence, judicial 
review, and separation of powers. Thus, with the rise of national 
bureaucratic structures in the late nineteenth century, it is not 
surprising that lawyers and courts would be enlisted in the defense of 
traditional liberties against the new leviathan. What better way to 
protect individuals from the arbitrary power of the regulatory state 
than to ensure that courts and lawyers sat atop that state, and to 




Judicial review is thus the final element in the story of the 
historical origins of American regulatory exceptionalism. Its basis in 
the idea that courts and lawyers have a special role in protecting 
individual liberty connects it with the laissez-faire ideology that is 
prevalent in American political culture. Its rise also identifies it as yet 
another institutional characteristic of American government that has 
the effect of limiting the strong regulatory impulses that have 
frequently emerged from American society. A political victory 
establishing a new regulatory regime could easily be undermined by 
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judicial oversight or the proceduralization of the administrative 
process. 
The story of the weak American administrative state and the 
prevalence of judicial control of the administrative processes are thus 
linked. They also sit within the same ideological medium: an 
American political culture where a commitment to laissez-faire 
principles is in constant struggle with both republican communal 
values and the felt political necessities of responding to the 
dislocations caused by a modern, capitalist economy. The policy 
impulses that flow out of this complex, contradictory political culture 
are themselves warped and dampened by American institutional 
arrangements. Intense judicial review, the proceduralization of the 
administrative process, the divisions of government power, and the 
persistent localism of the dominant political parties combine to make 
regulatory action, particularly at the national level, difficult. 
 
 
